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ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of this study is to find out if family ownership of firms has any effect 
on firm performance. And if there is an effect, to see if it leads to a positive or negative 
impact on the performance of a firm. A large share of firms is controlled by families 
worldwide. Korea is well known as a country that has a high percentage of family-owned 
firms. South Korea also has special ownership structures for firms, including the large 
conglomerates known as Chaebol, of which most are family-owned. As previous studies 
of Korean firms tend to focus on the Chaebols, this study instead focuses on smaller firms 
listed on the Korean Exchange.  
 
Data is collected for 307 non-financial companies that were continuously listed on the 
KOSPI SmallCap index during the years 2013-2017, giving 5 years of balanced data. The 
measures used to assess firm performance were both a market measure (Tobin’s Q) and 
accounting measures (ROE and two measures of ROA).  
 
Firms were defined as family-owned if any of three conditions were satisfied: if the CEO 
or a family member of the CEO is a board member, or if the CEO and/or the family 
members own more than 20% of the firm’s equity, or if the current CEO is a family mem-
ber of the previous CEO or the founder of the firm. 
 
So far, many previous studies have shown that family ownership will solve the issue of 
the agency problem, which leads to the result that family-owned firms outperform non-
family firms. In this paper, using pooled OLS regression, the relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance was examined using Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. 
The regression results show at a significant level that family-owned firms have higher 
ROE and ROA values than non-family owned firms, while family-owned firms had lower 
values for Tobin’s Q than non-family owned firms.  








In the previous few decades, various family-owned firms had a great impact on develop-
ing the economies of countries. Family-owned firms are prevalent around the world. 
Large, controlling shareholders have been found to be highly common among public 
firms, and the majority of them are families, the founders and their descendants (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). European 
cross-country studies have shown that family-owned firms account for over 50% of firms 
(Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Maury, 2006). Anderson & Reeb (2003b) found that family 
ownership is both prevalent and substantial, with 35% of the firms on the S&P 500 in the 
U.S. being family-owned. These family-owned firms were also found to perform better 
than non-family owned firms. Moreover, another analysis showed that when the CEO 
position is served by family members, the firm outperforms firms with outside CEOs. 
The results of some studies thus seem to indicate that family ownership is an effective 
ownership structure. 
 
In Asian countries, most firms (over half) are family-owned, and families or individuals 
regulate more than half of all companies (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio, 
Larry, & Young, 2001). The typical problem in many emerging countries is that families 
are dominant in most aspects of the firms. In comparison, the controlling families present 
a unique problem in Korean firms as they control firms by pyramidal equity ownership 
through affiliated firms, even though they directly own only a small fraction of shares. In 
2002, despite families among the top 10 business groups holding a low ownership fraction 
of only about 8.62% of shares, the families could still exercise control using affiliated 
firms (An & Naughton, 2009). Lim & Kim (2005) examined the ownership structures of 
Korean conglomerates as of December 1995 and found that pyramidal ownership with a 
low family stake is a common ownership structure among Korean conglomerates. A com-
mon misconception about Korean firms, especially chaebols in academia and the popular 
media is that the CEO or chairman of chaebol groups are referred to as the “owners”. This 
is not strictly correct, as the families achieve control with a small ownership concentration 
(Kim, 2006). 
 
There are a few reasons why families in South Korea were able to enjoy practically un-
disputed control with low ownership concentration. One reason is that the laws that pro-
tect small shareholders have been comparably weak, which allowed the controlling share-
holders to keep their low fractional ownership. As an example, in the period 1993–1997 
before the Asian financial crisis, shareholders had to have an ownership stake of at least 
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five percent in order to exercise rights such as demanding a meeting, filing a derivative 
suit or inspecting account books. Due to this, small shareholders did not have tools for 
monitoring the controlling family. The minimum ownership stake required was lowered 
in 1998 after the crisis. Another reason allowing for control with a low ownership stake 
is that the voting rights of institutional investors in listed companies had restrictions. 
Shadow voting regulations required institutional investors to remain neutral: they had to 
cast their votes proportionate to other votes. Due to this fact, the institutional investors 
did not pose a threat to the controlling families although they held significant ownership 
stakes in Korean firms (Kim, 2006).  
 
Compared to other firms that are not owned by families, family ownership of firms has a 
significantly different effect on performance. South-Korea in particular has several major 
conglomerates and those firms have had a few issues about agency problems. They have 
also had issues with illegal financial behavior, a recent example being when the chairman 
of Lotte Group and Samsung Group’s de facto chief were jailed for bribery charges in 
connection to a scandal led to the ousting of South Korea’s President Park Geun-Hye in 
2017 (their sentences were later suspended) (Yang, Park, & Wardell, 2019).  The South 
Korean government has sought to reduce the country’s economic reliance on these large 
family-run conglomerates by supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(Song, 2014). In 2017, the Ministry of SMEs and Startups was established by the govern-
ment for this purpose (Lee, 2017). 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
Considering the prevalence of family firms worldwide, it is important to investigate how 
family ownership affects firm performance. Hence, this thesis aims to investigate the im-
pact family ownership has on firm performance for firms in South Korea, or if it has any 
impact at all. A literature review is combined with an empirical study of data on listed 
firms in South Korea. 
  
Many previous papers have studied the large Korean conglomerates (known as chaebols), 
and it is well-established that families play a significant role in these firms. This thesis 
aims to contribute by looking at smaller publicly listed firms that include family-owned 
firms that are not affiliated with chaebols. This will make it possible to see if there is a 
difference in performance between large firms affiliated with chaebol families and non-
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chaebol family firms in South Korea. As such, this thesis will focus on how family own-
ership affects firm performance, with evidence from firms listed on the KOSPI SmallCap 





Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest that a widely-mentioned setback of family ownership 
is the agency problem, which comes from the compound of ownership and control power 
that makes concentrated shareholders improve their profits from private rents. Shleifer & 
Vishny (1997) examine how family-owned firms tend to treat the firm as a family em-
ployment service or a private bank.  
 
However, when the manager of a firm is also the owner of a firm, it can also reduce 
agency problems. Families are undiversified investors who tend to have invested the ma-
jority of their wealth into the family business, and so their financial well-being is very 
much tied to the performance of the firm. Alternatively, even if an outside CEO manages 
the firm, the family still has a strong incentive to closely monitor the management of the 
firm. Also, as families tend to be present in the firm for a long time, they can have an 
advantage when it comes to knowledge of some specific technology related to the firm or 
the market. The long-term presence of the family also allows the family firm to create a 
good reputation among its customers and bondholders. The stronger relationship between 
the family-owned firm and the bondholders reduces the conflicts between them (Andres, 
2008). 
 
This thesis examines the association between family ownership and company perfor-
mance in South Korea. A considerable number of studies have shown that family-owned 
firms have several strengths. In this thesis, the focus will be on how family ownership has 
a positive effect on companies’ operation and firm performance in South Korea.  
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is whether family-owned firms outperform non-family 
owned firms.  
 
𝐻1 = Family-owned firms outperform non-family owned firms.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Anderson & Reeb (2003b) show that family-owned firms significantly outperform non-
family owned firms. Data from 1992 until 1999 was investigated for a sample of 403 
firms listed on the S&P 500. Banks and public utilities were excluded from the sample 
because of challenges in calculating Tobin’s Q for banks, and because government regu-
lations can affect firm performance. Family-owned firms had 6.65% higher ROA than 
firms that are not family-owned. Also, their test suggests that the greater profitability in 
family-owned firms, relative to non-family owned firms, stems from those firms in which 
a family member serves as the CEO. Additional evidence which shows that family-owned 
firms perform at least as well as non-family owned firms can be found from market-based 
measures of firm performance. Especially, with univariate test and multivariate analysis, 
it was shown that family-owned firms have higher Tobin’s Q values than non-family 
owned firms. These results are significant statistically and economically.  
 
In contrast, Faccio et al. (2001) examined that family ownership in East Asia causes se-
vere problems. They found that systematic expropriation of outside shareholders occurred, 
allowing the controlling shareholders to extract high returns from projects that give neg-
ative results to the firm. As these projects accumulated along with their debt that could 
not be repaid, it helped trigger the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. Particularly good 
opportunities for expropriation come up when a firm is affiliated with a group of firms 
that are all controlled by the same shareholder. Faccio et al. (2001) found that this was 
true for about half of the firms that they examined in both Western Europe and in East 
Asia. Insiders can expropriate corporate wealth by setting unfair terms for sales of goods 
and services within the group and transferring assets and control stakes. Dividends can 
be used to decrease expropriation by controlling shareholders. Firms in Western Europe 
paid substantially higher dividend rates than in East Asia. Additionally, when there were 
several large shareholders present, the dividend rates were higher in Western Europe, but 
lower in East Asia. So in Western Europe, the other large shareholders helped limit the 
controlling shareholder’s expropriation of minority shareholders, but in East Asia, they 
colluded in the expropriation. Similar results for Western Europe were reported by Sac-
ristán-Navarro et al., who also found that large shareholders seem to monitor managers 
and decrease the private benefits of control enjoyed by families (Sacristán-Navarro, 
Gómez-Ansón, & Cabeza-García, 2011). Faccio et al. (2001) also mention that the prob-
lems the family-owned firms have are connected not only to corporate governance but 




2.1 Possible advantages and disadvantages of family firms. 
 
Demsetz & Lehn (1985) insist that investors who have high ownership are offered sub-
stantial financial profit to diminish conflicts related to agency problems and maximize 
firm value. Shyu (2011) and Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer (2003) mention that concen-
trated ownership authorizes family members to manage their profits more than other 
shareholders can. Many hypotheses have been presented for how ownership concentra-
tion impacts the performance of a firm. However, it is not always clear how ownership 
concentration affects firm performance. Concentrated ownership can give both benefits 
and disadvantages to the performance of a firm (Kim, 2006). 
 
2.1.1 Extended investment horizons 
 
The long-term characteristic of family ownership relieves family members, giving them 
a tendency to have a longer investment horizon compared to other investors. The extended 
horizons of family firms have been suggested as a reason for family firms performing 
better than similar non-family firms in the same industry group (James, 1999). Although 
the combination of ownership and management can minimize principal-agent problems 
and lower monitoring costs, the firm value can decrease as the owner-manager may 
choose not to maximize the value of the firm, but instead engage in “on-the-job” non-
pecuniary consumption and preferring immediate consumption instead of carrying out 
optimal investment decisions (Demsetz, 1983). When the ownership and management of 
a firm are separated, managers make investments according to the market investment rule, 
however, the value of the firm is decreased by higher monitoring costs and agency prob-
lems. According to James (1999), family firms do not have these issues, unlike non-fam-
ily firms.  
 
A manager of a firm who is a member of the family sees a connection between his actions 
in the firm and the welfare of other family members, which gives the family manager a 
longer perspective of time. Due to this, family managers may be less likely to choose their 
personal interests over family considerations. One of the main strengths of families is the 
view that present-time sacrifices eventually lead to long-run benefits for every member 
of the family. This can be a reason for managers to extend their time horizons, changing 
the performance of the family firm over time. Family wealth is strongly connected to firm 
performance; therefore, family members have a great incentive to monitor managers and 
enhance firm performance (James, 1999). Anderson & Reeb (2003b) also agree on James’ 
(1999) view that family firms make long-term investments, as family members view the 
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company as something to give to their descendants, thus preferring investments that are 
profitable in the long-term. 
 
Shareholders with a long-term investment horizon can decrease the problem of manage-
rial myopia. Managerial myopia is caused by managers fearing takeover of the firm by 
having the firm bought out at an undervalued price, leading them to focus more on short-
term profits over long-term goals. If there are no short-term pressures, the managers will 
not have any significant motivation to allocate resources to assure that the stock is not 
undervalued at any point in time. Instead, they can focus on making investment decisions 
that are more efficient over the long-term (Stein, 1988). 
 
The concentrated ownership of family firms could contribute to their extended investment 
horizons. As entrenched blockholders, families can be more inclined to make firm-spe-
cific investments, for instance, firm-specific human capital investments and research and 
development. But it can also be argued that firms being widely held can contribute to 
extended investment horizons. This is because widely held firms can provide improved 
liquidity of stocks and better risk diversification for investors. So with a higher investor 
turnover, firms can take on more risky projects for innovations than firms with a concen-
trated ownership structure (Kim, 2006). 
 
James (1999) also mentioned that there are factors that can diminish or erase the extended 
horizons of family firms. One problem is tax-related laws for the transfer of the family 
firm to the next generation, for example, if the transfer is costly or there are other re-
strictions. Another problem is that family members may not want to join the firm or there 
might not be any competent family members that want to take over the family firm. Even 
if there are family members willing to take over the firm, there might also be non-family 
employees who are equally or more qualified, which can lead to serious conflicts for con-
trol of the company between family and non-family members. Nepotism, where family 
members are chosen instead of more qualified non-family workers, is also a problem. 
Unstable families, where family members struggle among themselves for control of the 
firm, might not have the intergenerational loyalty which gives managers the extended 
investment horizon. However, there can also be downsides to maintaining family stability. 
For example, family members might choose not to express their opinions or disagree with 
the managers of the firm in order to avoid offending or causing conflicts with other family 
members. This leads to new ideas not being introduced or hinders an effective response 




2.1.2. Risk aversion 
 
Many studies show that family firms use debt financing more conservatively than non-
family firms. McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko (2001) compared the debt financing in 
founding family-controlled firms and non-founding family-controlled public firms in the 
US for the period 1986 to 1988. The authors hypothesized that founding-family controlled 
firms are more efficient, and choose less risky capital structures. These factors in turn 
affect the firm value, so it was also hypothesized that founding-family controlled firms 
have higher market-to-book equity ratios. The authors’ also proposed that family owner-
managers have greater incentives than non-family managers to increase the value of the 
firm. McConaughy et al. (2001) also saw some issues in family firms, such as family 
managers having an unclear financial vision, the complexity of relationships among fam-
ily members, and that authority and responsibility are not defined well in the organiza-
tional structure of family firms. 
 
In the study by McConaughy et al. (2001), the capital structures of founding family-con-
trolled firms and non-founding family-controlled firms were compared using cash divi-
dend payout ratios and total debt to total assets. The results showed that founding family-
controlled firms have more conservative capital structures than firms that do not have 
family members as managers. Founding family-controlled firms used less debt (especially 
short-term debt) than non-founding family-controlled firms. Founding-family controlled 
firms were also more efficient and had higher market-to-book equity ratios. McConaughy 
et al. (2001) stated that these differences are more likely affected by family ownership 
than the management of the firm by family members. 
 
Mishra & McConaughy (1999) proposed that firms controlled by the founding family are 
less likely to use debt financing than non-founding family-controlled firms because they 
are more averse to control risk, the risk of losing control. The study on a sample of public 
US firms by Mishra & McConaughy (1999) showed that firms controlled by the founding 
family use less long-term debt and short-term debt than non-founding family-controlled 
firms. Founding family-controlled firms were significantly more averse to use short-term 
debt than non-founding family-controlled firms. Mishra & McConaughy (1999) stated 
that this aversion to debt financing could lead to the firms giving up profitable opportu-
nities for growth, which in turn could cause conflicts of interests between outside share-




Fama & Jensen (1985) examine how big, undiversified stockholders can have a different 
purpose when they make a financial decision compared to small stockholders. They may 
choose to make decisions based on their own preference of risk instead of based on the 
market cost. Thus, as families often are large, concentrated shareholders, with most of 
their wealth invested in the firm, they can be more careful and make more conservative 
investment decisions than managers in firms that are widely held (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Barclay & Holderness (1989) insist that a big stockholder may influence others’ 
interests to invest in a firm. This decreases the effectiveness of stock trading and decreases 
the value of the firm. 
 
Other than debt financing, firms’ aversion to risk can also be compared through their 
investments into R&D. The future growth of a firm is strongly related to new innovations. 
R&D investments are risky but are a significant contributor to a firm’s future survival. 
For instance, the study by Villalonga & Amit (2006) on family firms included a compar-
ison between the differences in R&D investments by family firms and non-family firms 
using the R&D-to-sales ratio, with the results showing that family firms spent less on 
R&D than non-family firms at a statistically significant level. 
 
Usually, most of the wealth of families is tied up in the family firm, making them large 
and undiversified investors. Due to this, families might try to implement risk reduction 
strategies. There are basically two methods to decrease the risk of the firm. The first strat-
egy is to allocate firm investments towards projects that are not related to the main busi-
ness of the firm. This allows for the controlling family to diversify their investments, 
which is favorable to them. However, it may not be beneficial to smaller shareholders 
who diversify their investments themselves. Families might also reduce their risk by seek-
ing less risky forms of financing (i.e. lower default probability). This is achieved by rely-
ing more on equity financing or by using less debt overall in the firm’s capital structure. 
Thus, the family restricts the ability of the firm to raise external funds for investment 
projects, and the potential advantage of a higher debt tax shield is given up. These strate-
gies for reducing risk generate costs for well-diversified minority shareholders of the fam-
ily firm. Contrary to these arguments stated by Anderson & Reeb (2003a), they found that 
family firms listed in the S&P 500 from 1993 to 1999 are less diversified and have similar 
leverage ratios to non-family firms. 
 
The results in a study by Anderson, Duru & Reeb (2012) supported the theory that family 
firms are prone to risk aversion. The study examined the impact family shareholders have 
on corporate investment policy for 2000 of the largest public non-financial, non-utility 
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firms in the US from 2003 to 2007. The authors found that as a fraction of total assets, 
family firms spend about 7.50% less on long-term investments than non-family firms. 
The evidence provided suggested that families with high ownership levels and high levels 
of firm risk mainly account for this difference. After controlling for endogeneity concerns, 
the results still suggested that family firms spend less on investments relative to non-
family firms.  
 
For the two types of firm investment, R&D spending and capital expenditures, R&D 
spending has a larger effect on firm risk than capital expenditures. Capital expenditures 
are allotted to projects that have quite well-defined economic benefits and/or existing 
products. The assets that capital investments are made up of are relatively easy to sell in 
case of project failure. The outcomes of R&D investments are less predictable. This im-
plies that R&D spending should be especially sensitive to family firms’ tendencies for 
risk aversion Anderson et al. (2012).  
 
In the study by Anderson et al. (2012), when the long-term investment was split up into 
R&D spending and capital expenditures, it was found that family firms, as a fraction of 
total investment, spend about 15.55% more on capital expenditures than non-family firms. 
Moreover, the authors found that family owners seem to limit R&D spending, as family 
firms spent about 31.05% less capital on R&D investments relative to non-family firms. 
The results thus suggest that undiversified or concentrated investors have a preference for 
making investments in the form of less risky capital expenditures over riskier R&D in-
vestments. However, one possible explanation for the smaller spending on R&D by fam-
ily firms is that the families are strong and committed monitors that significantly improve 
the productive and efficient use of resources on R&D. In an additional test performed by 
the authors, they found that family firms obtain fewer patents and patent citations per 
dollar invested into R&D compared to non-family firms, which implies that family mon-
itoring does not explain why family firms spend less on R&D. Further analysis showed 
that outside investors discount family firms with lower R&D investments compared to 
non-family firms in the same industry.  
 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) studied a sample of firms from the Lehman Brothers 
Bond database and S&P 500, and they found that when firms are owned by founding 
families, there seems to be a decrease in agency conflicts between the shareholders and 
bondholders of the firm. This in turn reduces the cost of debt. The reasons proposed by 
the authors for this reduction in agency conflicts are the long-term horizon of family firms, 
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familial pressure and the undiversified portfolios held by founding family owners. In con-
trast, diversified shareholders might have incentives to expropriate the wealth of bond-
holders by making investments in high-risk, high expected-return projects, because they 
obtain the excess return if the investments succeed, while bondholders have to pay for the 
costs of failure. Due to this conflict of interest, bondholders demand higher interest rates. 
Due to the lower cost of debt financing enjoyed by family firms, bondholders appear to 
hold the view that founding family ownership is an organizational structure that is better 
at protecting their interests. However, when a descendant of the founder is the CEO of 
the firm, the cost of debt financing seems to increase. Although overall, regardless of who 
holds the CEO position, the cost of debt financing was found to be lower for family firms 
compared to non-family firms. 
 
 
2.2 Previous studies in the US and Canada 
 
McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, & Mishra (1998) used a matched-pairs methodology 
to compare the performance of 219 US founding-family controlled firms with non-family 
firms for the years 1986 to 1988. The matched-pairs methodology pairs family-owned 
firms with non-family owned firms that have similar characteristics and features. Market-
to-book equity ratios, similar to Tobin’s Q, and market returns were used to assess firm 
performance. Sales growth and accounting ratios were used to determine the operating 
efficiencies of the firms. The results proved that founding-family controlled firms are 
more efficient and are more valuable with regard to the market-to-book equity ratios when 
compared against firms that are in the same industry, of the same size, and have similar 
ownership levels by management.  
 
Lee (2006) examined the performance of family-owned firms compared to firms owned 
by diverse owners on a sample very similar to the sample of Anderson & Reeb (2003b). 
Like the sample of Anderson & Reeb (2003b), the sample consisted of firms listed on the 
S&P 500, excluding public utilities and banks, but the sample period was extended from 
1992–1999 to 1992–2002. By extending the sample period, a full business cycle is exam-
ined as both the economic growth period from 1992 until March 2001 and the economic 
recession of 2001 is included. The study used the same definition for a family firm as 
Anderson & Reeb (2003b), giving the same share of family firms for the sample at about 
35%. Unlike most other studies which focus on financial performance, this study focused 
on the economic performance of a firm. Firm performance was measured using revenue 
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growth, gross income growth, employment growth and net profit margin. The findings 
indicated that family firms have faster growth and are more profitable than non-family 
firms. Even though family firms grow faster, there was no evidence for them being less 
stable than non-family firms in the long run. It was also found that founding family mem-
ber participation in management could improve the performance even more. 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) studied the performance of all Fortune-500 firms listed dur-
ing 1994–2000. Tobin’s Q was used as the measure of firm performance. Family owner-
ship was found to add value when the founder serves as the CEO or as the Chairman with 
a non-family CEO. However, if descendants serve as the CEO or Chairman, family own-
ership destroys value. Family firms that use control-enhancing mechanisms are less val-
uable than family firms without them, but they still outperform non-family firms.  
 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella (2007) studied a sample of 896 industrial 
and service firms from the Fortune 1000 for the years 1996 to 2000, while a random 
sample of 100 smaller U.S. firms was also studied to check for selection bias. Tobin’s Q 
was used as the measure of firm performance. Unlike several previous studies, they dis-
tinguished between lone founder firms that have one or several founders without any rel-
atives in the business, with family firms, which have several executives or major owners 
simultaneously or over time from the same family. The results for the Fortune 1000 sam-
ple showed that lone founder firms outperform non-family firms, while family-owned 
firms do not outperform non-family firms. For the sample of 100 smaller firms, neither 
family-owned nor lone founder firms outperformed other firms.  
 
King & Santor (2008) studied the relationship between family ownership and firm per-
formance for a sample of 613 Canadian non-financial firms for the period 1998 to 2005. 
Family firms from their sample had superior ROA, but their Tobin’s Q ratio was lower 
compared to other firms. The reason proposed for this was that family-owned firms might 
have higher profitability, but that future expectations on cash flows are lower because 
investors see a threat of expropriation by the controlling shareholders. A further test di-
vided the family firms into those with a single share class and those with dual-class shares. 
These results showed that compared to other firms, family firms with a single share class 
have superior ROA, while the Tobin’s Q ratios are similar. The Tobin’s Q ratios were 17% 
lower for family firms with dual-class shares compared to other firms, while ROA was 
similar. From this, the authors concluded that family ownership does not have a negative 
impact on the performance of Canadian firms, but the use of control-enhancing mecha-




Martikainen, Nikkinen, & Vähämaa (2009) investigated the relationship between family 
ownership and production efficiency on a sample of 159 manufacturing firms listed on 
the S&P for the years 1992–1999. Family firms appeared to have higher Tobin’s Q and 
ROA than non-family firms. The aim of the study was to find out if differences in pro-
duction technologies and production efficiency lead to the higher valuation and profita-
bility experienced by family firms. The study found that the production technologies of 
family firms and non-family firms are not different, and that family firms have a higher 
production output than non-family firms. As differences in production technologies did 
not cause the differences in production output, it was concluded that family firms are 
considerably more productive than non-family firms.  
 
Kashmiri & Mahajan (2014) compared the performance of family-owned firms and non-
family owned firms during recessions using Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance. 
The sample included 275 large companies publicly listed in the US over the period 2000-
2009. The results showed that family firms perform better than non-family firms during 
recessions and also during non-recession years. In fact, the superior performance of fam-
ily firms increases additionally during recessions. However, after family ownership 
reaches a certain level, additional increases in family ownership lower firm performance. 
 
 
2.3 Previous studies in Europe 
 
Some studies examined the performance of family firms across multiple countries in Eu-
rope. Barontini & Caprio (2006) investigated the performance of a sample of 675 large 
corporations traded publicly in 11 countries in continental Europe for the years 1999–
2001 and concluded that family ownership improves firm performance. Tobin’s Q and 
ROA were used as measures of firm performance. Family ownership had a very positive 
impact on firm performance if the founder is still active either as CEO or non-executive 
director. Family ownership was also positive when the descendants were active, provided 
that they were limited to non-executive roles. When descendants took on the role of CEO, 
the relationship between firm performance and family ownership was just non-negative. 
Only family firms where the family was not represented on the board seemed to fare 




Maury (2006) examined the performance of family-controlled firms compared to non-
family firms in Western Europe using Tobin’s Q and ROA as measures of firm perfor-
mance. The sample consisted of 1672 non-financial firms from 13 different countries. 
Firms with active family ownership, defined as when a family member holds at least one 
of the top two officer positions, were found to have improved profitability. Firms with 
passive family ownership did not have higher performance compared to nonfamily firms. 
Also, the higher performance of family firms occurred in nonmajority-controlled firms, 
while there was no notable relation between family ownership and firm performance in 
majority-controlled firms. This suggests that family opportunism may increase at higher 
control levels.  
 
Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schønea (2005) compared the performance of family-owned firms 
against non-family firms for a sample of 438 Norwegian firms for the year 1996. Produc-
tivity was used as the measure of performance. The results showed family-owned firms 
to be less productive than non-family firms, with the difference in productivity being es-
timated to be around 10%. The authors presented differences in management regimes as 
the reason for this difference. Family-owned firms that were managed by an outside man-
ager were as productive as non-family firms. Family-owned firms with a manager from 
the owning family were estimated to be about 14% less productive than non-family firms. 
 
Sraer & Thesmar (2007) investigated the performance of about 420 non–financial, non–
real estate firms per year listed on the French stock exchange between 1994 and 2000. 
The measures of firm performance used were ROA, ROE, payout ratio (evaluated only 
for firms with positive pre-tax profit, defined as dividends divided by pre-tax profit) and 
the market-to book-ratio (defined as the sum of market capitalization and the book value 
of assets minus book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets). The results 
showed that family firms outperform non-family firms.  
 
Andres (2008) examined the relationship between founding-family ownership and firm 
performance for a sample of 275 non-financial German listed companies for the period 
1998 to 2004. ROA and Tobin’s Q were used as measures of firm performance. The au-
thor found that family firms are more profitable than other firms with a controlling share-
holder and firms with a dispersed shareholder structure. However, only family firms in 
which the founding family is still actively exercising control either on the executive or 
the supervisory board have superior performance, with the positive effect being the great-
est when the founder serves as CEO. Andres also noted that family ownership might even 
be disadvantageous for some industries, as very few family firms were found in capital-
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intensive industries. The reason for this is that as the family aims to maintain control, it 
could present an obstacle to access external funds.  
 
Kowalewski Talavera, & Stetsyuk (2010) investigated a sample of 217 Polish companies 
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2005. ROA, operating ROA (oROA), 
and ROE were used as measures of firm performance, and it was found that these were 
significantly higher for family-owned firms compared to non-family owned firms. How-
ever, when looking at the degree of family ownership, an inverted U-shaped relationship 
was found. That is, the firm performance rises with an increasing share of family owner-
ship up until a certain point when it starts to drop. This result is in agreement with the 
results of the study by Anderson & Reeb (2003b). It was also found family members 
being involved in the management of the firm, either by having a higher share of voting 
rights or having a family member as the CEO, affected firm performance positively at a 
significant level. But when family management of the firm was represented by the pres-
ence of family board chairmen, there was no significant relationship with firm perfor-
mance. 
 
Sacristán-Navarro, Gómez-Ansón, Cabeza-García (2011) did not find any significant re-
lationship between firm performance (measured with ROA) and family ownership for a 
sample consisting of 118 nonfinancial Spanish firms for the period 2002 to 2008. How-
ever, family control seemed to negatively affect firm performance (the presence of family 
members in management and/or on the board of directors).  
 
Galve-Górriz & Salas-Fumás (2011) examined the difference in performance between 
family and non-family firms for a sample of 51 non-financial, non-regulated firms listed 
on the Spanish Stock Exchange between 1990 and 2004. The performance measures used 
were the accounting measures ROA, ROA/r (ROA divided by the cost of debt) and a 
market measure, Tobin’s Q. The performance of family firms did not differ from those of 
non-family firms using these measures. The study also evaluated differences in produc-
tive efficiency were using Solow’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Family firms were 
found to be more productive as the TFP of family firms was higher than for non-family 
firms. Also, the production technologies of family firms and non-family firms were found 
to be different, with family firms using less capital-intensive technologies. The reason 
proposed for this difference in productivity was that family firms have a lower limit on 
investments because they prefer to maintain control, so they can reduce this limitation by 




Schank, Murgea & Enache (2017) analyzed the firm performance of companies in Ro-
mania and Germany using return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as 
measures of financial performance. The results showed that family ownership leads to 
improved firm performance in both countries.  
 
 
2.4 Previous studies in East Asia 
 
Choi, Park & Yoo (2007) found that family ownership of firms has a negative impact on 
firm performance in South Korea. Firm performance was measured with Tobin’s Q. The 
sample analyzed consisted of about 460 non-financial firms listed on the Korea Stock 
Exchange from 1999 to 2002. The authors stated that a likely reason for the negative 
effects of family ownership is the entrenchment of family manager-owners. Although the 
founders initially contribute as entrepreneurs, it seems like the costs exceed the benefits 
of continuing to keep the firm ownership and management under the family. 
 
Allouche, Amann, Jaussaud & Kurashina (2008) conducted a study on pairs of non-fi-
nancial family and non-family listed Japanese companies for the years 1998 and 2003. 
The year 1998 represents the time of the Asian financial crisis, while by the year 2003 
the Japanese economy had recovered. The matched pairs were in the same industry and 
of the same size. The 1998 sample had 87 pairs of firms, and the 2003 sample had 156 
pairs. The family firms found in the 1998 sample were also found in the 2003 sample, 
while the non-family firms could differ. The measures of firm performance used in the 
study were ROA, ROE and return on invested capital (ROIC). It was concluded that fam-
ily businesses perform better than non-family businesses for all of the measures of firm 
performance. It was also found that strongly controlled family businesses have better firm 
performance compared to weakly controlled family businesses, showing that the level of 
family control has a strong impact on performance.  
 
Tsao, Chen, Lin, & Hyde (2009) studied the performance of 688 Taiwanese publicly 
listed firms for the years 2004 to 2006. Return on Assets (ROA) and ROE was used to 
measure firm performance. Their findings suggested that founding-family ownership 
does not seem to have any significant association with firm performance. 
 
Chu (2011) evaluated the performance of 1154 public non-financial companies in Taiwan 
for the years 2002 to 2007. ROA was used to measure firm performance, and the results 
showed that founding-family ownership positively affects firm performance. In addition, 
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the results seemed to indicate that the positive effects of family-ownership occur when 
the firm is actively managed and controlled by the family. The positive relationship was 
also more significant for small- and medium-sized enterprises than for large companies.  
 
Shyu (2011) also studied the performance of Taiwanese listed firms. The sample con-
sisted of 465 firms for the period 2002 to 2006, using ROA and Tobin’s Q as firm per-
formance indicators. The results for both indicators showed that family-owned firms per-
form better than non-family firms. Moreover, the results showed that ROA increases with 
increasing family ownership until a family ownership percentage of 30%, after which it 
starts to decline.  
 
An & Naughton (2009) investigated how family ownership affects firm value and earn-
ings quality of non-financial firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) during the 
period after the Asian financial crisis from 2000 to 2005. The sample consisted of 3054 
firm-year observations, with ROA and Tobin’s Q used as measures of firm performance. 





Some studies investigating the relationship between family ownership and firm perfor-
mance have mentioned the issue with the endogeneity of results (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003b; Andres, 2008). Results that show that family firms perform better than non-family 
firms could be due to reversed causality. So the question is if it is the family firm owner-
ship structure that gives better firm performance or does the good performance of a firm 
have an impact on whether the firm is controlled by a family or not (Andres, 2008). When 
business is going well for the firm, it might make the family decide that they want to hold 
on to their ownership of the firm. And then, when the firm starts to perform worse or the 
future prospects look bad, the family might choose to sell their shares in the company 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003b). Hence, this could make it look like family firms perform 
better than non-family firms when investigating the relationship between family owner-
ship and firm performance.  
 
Andres (2008) argued against endogeneity being a problem. One argument against this is 
that the families owning the firms in Andres (2008) sample of German firms have held 
their ownership in the firms for 82 years. During the whole sample period of 1998–2004, 
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the average family ownership stayed at about 60%. This shows that family firms hold on 
to their shares and do not choose to sell when the economy is not going well. Another 
argument by Andres (2008) is that although families do indeed have an information ad-
vantage when it comes to knowing the future prospects of their firms, it is not likely that 
they can predict the performance for many decades. The same argument against endoge-
neity was also presented by Anderson & Reeb (2003b), as the family firms from the sam-
ple of S&P 500 firms had held their stake in the firms for about 75.9 years on average. 
They also added that it would be doubtful that families have more special insights than 
those of large institutional investors when it comes to finding out the future performance 




3. FEATURES OF OWNERSHIP 
 
 
3.1 Definition of a family firm  
 
The definition of a family firm is still argued about. Each firm has different ownership 
structures resulting in a myriad of different structures. The views of researchers are also 
different. The different criteria used to establish if a business is a family business include 
active management by family members, percentage of ownership, voting control, power 
over strategic direction and management by several family members from the same gen-
eration or from different generations (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996). 
 
The amount or the proportions of family members in the board of directors in a firm, 
including the owner, can be a measurement for defining family firms. Also, fractional 
ownership can give family executives certain rights to control the management of the firm. 
Thus, a proportionally large number of shares allow family members to manage firms 
directly and indirectly. The “narrow” definition for a family firm given by Shanker & 
Astrachan (1996) defines a family firm as one in which multiple generations actively 
exercise control, and that more than one member of the owning family has significant 
management responsibility.  
 
Another definition of the family firm is given by Anderson & Reeb (2003b), who classi-
fied firms as family firms when the family who founded the firm has an equity stake in 
the firm and/or there are family members present on the board of directors (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003b). Barontini & Caprio (2006) classify a firm as a family firm if the largest 
stockholder has at least 10% of the ownership rights or when either the family or the 
largest stockholder controls more than 51% of the voting rights. These definitions and 
other definitions used in the previous studies that were mentioned in chapters 2.2–2.4 
have been compiled in Table 1. Only unique definitions are listed as some studies used 
the same definition. Through this list containing various definitions of family firms, it is 
possible to conclude that there is no universal agreement on the definition of a family 
firm among researchers. Some studies also used a numerical measure for the ownership, 







Table 1. Definitions of the family firm used in previous studies. 
Authors, Year Family firm definition 
McConaughy, Walker, Hen-
derson & Mishra (1998) 
Founding family controlled firm – The CEO is either the founder or a 
member of the founder’s family. 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) Family firm – shares are owned by founding family members or de-
scendants, or they are present on the firm’s board of directors 
Barth, Gulbrandsen, Schøne 
(2005) 
Family firm – The family or one person owns at least 33% of the 
shares of a firm. 
Barontini & Caprio (2006) Family firm – the family holds more than 51% of the voting rights or 
have more than double of the direct voting rights that the second-
largest shareholder has 
Villalonga & Amit (2006) Family firm – a founder or a family member is an officer or a direc-
tor, or the family members together own at least 5% of equity 
Maury (2006) Family firm – 10% of voting rights are held by the family or the fam-
ily controlling shareholder is an unlisted firm 
Miller,  Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester & Cannella (2007) 
Family firm – Multiple family members are officers or directors, or 
own at least 5% of equity at the same time or over the company’s 
lifetime as family descendants  
Sraer & Thesmar (2007) Family firm – The family holds at least 20% of the voting rights of 
the firm 
Andres (2008) Family firm – The founder and/or family members hold more than 
25% of the voting rights, or a family holds at least 5% shares while a 




Family firm – An individual, an unlisted family firm or a family hold 
at least 25% of the voting rights of the firm 
Sacristán-Navarro, Gómez-
Ansón, Cabeza-García (2011) 
Family firm – A family or an individual hold more than 10% of the 
voting rights of the firm 
Galve-Górriz & Salas-Fumás 
(2011)  
Family firm – The sum of shares held directly and indirectly by 
shareholders with the same surname is the largest block holder in the 
company, and family members should be involved in the board and 
the management of the firm 
Shyu (2011) Family firm – the total ownership by family members exceed 10%, 






Miller et al. (2007) studied 28 different papers concerning family ownership, and also 
found a variety of definitions for the family firm. Miller et al. (2007) stated that the defi-
nition of family firms has a large significance, and came to the conclusion that the reason 
that family firms can be found to out-perform non-family firms is a result of how the 
family firms are defined. As was earlier mentioned in chapter 2.2, their study found that 
when the definition includes firms with large personal owners who do not have any rela-
tives associated with their firm, family firms outperform non-family firms. When lone-
founder firms are not included in the family firm category, the evidence of superior mar-
ket valuations for family firms is gone. The sample of Fortune 1000 firms in their study 
that had relatives as owners or managers never outperformed in market valuation, even 
during the first generation. Only firms with a lone founder outperform. For a sample of 
100 smaller randomly chosen firms, neither family firms nor lone founder firms had su-
perior valuation over non-family/lone founder firms. 
 
Family control of a firm does not have to mean direct ownership of a majority stake in 
the shares of a public firm. Control can also be held through pyramids, cross-sharehold-
ings, and dual-class shares. Pyramid ownership is common in Asian countries and also in 
some European countries. Dual-class shares mean that shares of different classes have 
different voting rights (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011). The owner of a company could 
for example put voting rights only on the part of shares that will be held by him/her, while 
not assigning voting rights to the other shares (Lim & Kim, 2005). Firms with dual-class 
shares are common in South Korea. The value of control block votes in South Korea is 
almost half of the firm’s market value. There is thus a large premium on shares with 
voting rights in South Korea (Nenova, 2003).  
 
Cross-shareholding is when a network of companies are connected horizontally, so one 
company holds shares of the other and vice versa. This enables an investor with a limited 
quantity of resources to become a controlling minority shareholder, exercising control 
power over a network of associated firms (Lim & Kim, 2005). A “controlling minority 
structure” is a structure that allows a shareholder to control a firm despite only possessing 
a small fraction of the equity claims on a company’s cash flows (Bebchuk, Kraakman, & 
Triantis, 2000). A pyramidal ownership structure is when family firms own their subsid-
iary firms indirectly through interfirm shareholdings. The operating companies are found 
at the bottom of the pyramid, with several layers of holding companies above them. A 





3.2 Family ownership of firms in South Korea 
 
In less developed economies or emerging markets, business groups have a better ability 
to use limited resources, overcoming market imperfections through internal capital mar-
kets and intragroup trading. When the economy develops, the possible benefits of over-
coming the market imperfections decrease, while there may be a rise in the cost of agency 
problems and conflicts of interest between controlling family shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Joh, 2003).  
 
The large conglomerate groups in South Korea, known as chaebol, came to exist follow-
ing the Second World War. The South Korean government allowed chaebol groups to 
take loans with low interest to develop their industries and other benefits to create wealth 
for the country after the Second World War. The South Korean government focused on 
specific fields such as the machinery industry. But the offers by the government were 
limited to the chaebol groups only. The chaebol system was dramatically successful, it 
made the South Korean economy grow significantly. GNP of South Korea in 1985 was 
20-times of what it was in 1965 (Chang & Chang, 1994).  
 
Most of these chaebol groups are managed by founding families or the owners’ family 
member executives. In South Korea, chaebols and family ownership are strongly con-
nected. A group of firms is defined as a chaebol by the Korean Fair Trade Law if the 
group’s controlling shareholder and its affiliate companies hold combined ownership of 
each firm which is greater than 30% of the outstanding shares (Lim & Kim, 2005). 
 
In South Korea, most firms are owned, controlled, and managed by families. As reported 
by Claessens et al. (2000), 67.9% of firms are controlled by families with a cutoff level 
for ultimate control at 10% of voting rights. With a cutoff level of 20%, the share of 
family firms is 48.4%. 80.7% of firms are managed by the controlling family (the CEO, 
board chairman and/or vice-chairman is from the controlling family), and 42.6% of firms 
are controlled through pyramidal ownership structure. Cross-holdings of affiliated firms 
are also used to some extent by controlling families to enhance their control. According 
to Bae, Kang, & Kim (2002), the use of cross-shareholdings is more popular than the use 
of pyramidal ownership structures in Korean business groups. This contrasts with the 





Claessens et al. (2000) insist that firms with families as the ultimate owners may not be 
concerned about the interests of minority shareholders. Joh (2003) examined the relation-
ship between corporate governance structure and firm performance for a sample of 5,829 
Korean firms for the period 1993–1997, which is before the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
took place. He noted that for many firms, controlling minority structures as described by 
Bebchuk et al. (2000) were present. In Korea, this ownership structure allows for control-
ling families to have dominant power at every level of management and facilitates the 
expropriation of outside shareholders. According to the IMF and the World Bank, this 
dominant family control using affiliated firms was one of the main causes of the financial 
crisis in 1997, and it is the biggest obstacle in improving corporate governance in Korea 
(An & Naughton, 2009).  
 
Another problem with firms affiliated with chaebols is their high reliance on debt financ-
ing. Before the Asian financial crisis, a generally held view was that an implicit guarantee 
by the government meant that there was no risk of default for the chaebols. Thus, chaebols 
could take on riskier projects than non-chaebols. Successful projects would generate prof-
its for the chaebols, and the cost of failed projects would be paid by the government and 
the taxpayers in the end (Kim, 2006). 
 
Joh (2003) showed that chaebol groups have a tendency to transfer their profits and wealth 
from one subsidiary firm to another. When this transfer of resources occurred, the re-
sources were often wasted, which lead to lower firm profitability. These results imply that 
tunneling took place, the controlling shareholders extracted resources out of the firm to 
increase their own wealth. Share values can be expropriated by chaebol owners by mov-
ing profits from subsidiary firms in which the family has a low stake to those firms in 
which it has a high stake (Kim, 2006). Although the firms belonging to a chaebol are 
independent firms, they aim to maximize the value of all affiliated firms in the chaebol 
group, not only the individual value of firms (Park, Kim, Ha, & Park, 2014). Joh (2003) 
found that independent firms outperform firms that are affiliated with chaebols. The prof-
itability of a firm was found to be lower when the controlling family’s ownership was 
lower, after controlling for industry, firm and macro-economic effects. Furthermore, firm 
profitability decreased the larger the difference between control rights and cash-flow 
rights. The negative effects of the gap in control rights and cash flow rights, and the inef-
ficiency in the internal capital market, were more severe in publicly traded firms than in 




Samsung Group provides an example of how minority shareholders of member firms in 
a chaebol were expropriated. To pave the way for his son to succeed him as the chairman, 
Samsung Group’s Chairman Lee Kun-Hee made Samsung SDS sell a total of 3.21 million 
shares of its bonds with warrants (BWs) to his son, Lee Jae-Yong, and three other family 
members for a price of only 7,150 Korean won per share. The BWs issued by Samsung 
SDS had a price of 55,000 KRW per share in the over-the-counter market at the time 
when these controversial share transfers took place. Clearly, the minority shareholders of 
Samsung SDS lost, while the wealth of the family of the controlling shareholder increased. 
Lee Jae-Yong’s stake in Samsung SDS increased to 10.1 percent. Lee Kun-Hee also re-
ceived criticism for transferring BWs in other Samsung Group companies in a similar 
way, such as Samsung Electronics, Samsung Everland and Samsung S1 (Bae et al., 2002). 
 
There have been many previous studies looking at the characteristics and significance of 
the largest chaebols of South Korea. This thesis intends to take a different approach by 
investigating the link between family ownership and firm performance for firms listed on 























4. AGENCY THEORY 
 
Agency theory is a theory of the relationship between principals and an agent of the prin-
cipals. Conventional agency problems are produced by separating ownership and man-
agement. This separation creates difficulty in controlling the firm through managers by 
supervisors. The owner-manager conflict is referred to as Agency Problem I by Villalonga 
& Amit (2006). The conflicts between shareholders’ and managers’ objectives cause 
agency problems. The agency problem increases when agents work for principals. The 
shareholders are principals; the managers of the firm are their agents. Agency costs are 
created when managers do not try to maximize firm value and costs are created by share-
holders in their efforts to monitor the managers and constrain their behaviors. A com-
pany’s board of directors is selected by the shareholders, and they are tasked with moni-
toring the management of a firm. The board of directors has a responsibility to represent 
the shareholders of the firm. Nowadays, boards also meet in sessions without the CEO 
present. In recent times, more chief executives have been forced out (Brealey et al., 2011).  
 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) classify an agency relationship as an agreement of an outside 
person to behave for another person when the firm’s principal gives the rights to an agent 
to make decisions for the firm. To make it clear that the agent works for the firm’s profit, 
agency costs occur. The principals of a firm usually give several incentives to make the 
agent work for the owner or executives’ interest. Another type of cost caused by the 
agency relationship is bonding costs. Bonding costs occur when the agent spends re-
sources on ensuring that the actions that he/she takes will not harm the principal, or to see 
that the principal is compensated if such an action does take place. An example of a bond-
ing cost would be limitations set in the manager’s contract on his/her decision-making 
power. Despite the agency costs and bonding costs undertaken to steer the agent towards 
making decisions that optimally favor the principal, there will still be some differences 
between the decisions made by the agent and the decisions which would maximize the 
principal’s welfare. The third cost of the agency relationship is the monetary value of this 
decrease in the welfare of the principal caused by these differences, referred to as the 
residual loss.  
 
If a manager completely owns the company he manages, the decisions made by the man-
ager aim to maximize his/her utility. These decisions do not only include monetary returns, 
but also the utility derived from different non-pecuniary aspects of being a manager for 
the company, such as spending on a luxurious office, facilities and cars. If other share-
holders own equity in the company, agency costs arise as the interests of the shareholders 
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and owner-manager differ. The smaller the share of equity owned by the owner-manager, 
the smaller his/her share of the outcomes is. This can make the owner-manager try to 
allocate more of the corporate resources in the form of perks, which will make the outside 
shareholders want to spend more resources on monitoring the owner-manager’s behavior 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
The most important agency conflict may be that as the ownership claim of the manager 
decreases, the manager’s incentive to dedicate considerable effort to creative actions such 
as searching for new profitable projects decreases. The manager might decide to avoid 
such attempts because it would take too much effort to manage or to learn about new 
technologies. This is also a form of utility for the owner-manager, which can result in the 
value of the firm being lower than it potentially could be (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).    
 
The agency problem inevitably causes costs for the owners of a firm. The most common 
case is for large, global listed corporations. They have millions of small owners who do 
not hold a significant proportion of the firm, and the firm is controlled by agents hired 
from outside of the firm (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2014). Nevertheless, the separation of 
management and ownership is necessary for big firms. But in a family-owned firm, there 
is little opportunity to anticipate advantages from this separation. The reason is that it is 
hard to be free from the power of the head of the firm when the firm’s discretion is limited 
to family members. Even if managers from the outside are used, family ownership can 
still have a mitigating effect on Agency Problem I. This is because family owners, as 
large shareholders of the firm, have greater incentives to monitor the manager. But if 
family members are present in the management of the firm, this can lead to the elimination 
of Agency Problem I in the firm. When the owners have their trusted family members 
acting as agents, they do not need to spend resources on monitoring. If the CEO of the 
firm is a family member, the CEO has the same interests as the family. However, the 
gains from the mitigating effect family management can have on Agency Problem I can 
be offset if professional managers hired from the outside would be better at managing the 
firm than family members Villalonga & Amit (2006). 
 
However, the controlling position held by family owners can give rise to another problem, 
called Agency Problem II by Villalonga & Amit (2006). In family firms, conflicts of in-
terest may arise between minority shareholders and family shareholders. Family members, 
with their large concentrated ownership of the firm’s equity, can use their controlling 
position in the firm to extract private benefits instead of trying to maximize the overall 
value of the firm. The minority shareholders then bear the cost of this behavior. The main 
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agency problem in corporations worldwide is to restrict the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders. This agency problem between minority and 
controlling shareholders can be more serious when there is a lack of mechanisms to pro-
tect minority investors and govern the discretionary power of large shareholders (Bae et 
al., 2002). In fact, families having a high concentration of control of major firms in de-
veloping economies in East Asia can have led to the legal protection of minority share-
holders being limited. The controlling families could also use their power to “lobby” pub-
lic officials and government agencies for preferential treatment, for example through pref-
erential public contracts, trade barriers, non-market-based financing, or through other 
ways (Claessens et al., 2000).  
 
If the large shareholder of a firm is an institution instead of a family firm, for example, a 
bank, a widely held corporation, or an investment fund, the private benefits extracted 
from minority shareholders would be shared among several independent owners. This 
decreases the incentives of the large shareholder for expropriating minority shareholders, 
but at the same time, the incentives for monitoring the manager is also smaller. Thus, 
Agency problem I can be more of a problem in firms with an institution as the largest 
shareholder, while Agency Problem II can be the more significant problem in family-















5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1 Data selection 
 
The data collected is from firms listed on the Korean Composite Stock Price Index 
(KOSPI) SmallCap index on the Korea Exchange (KRX).  
The data is gathered for a period of five years, from the year 2013 to 2017. A list of 
companies listed on the KOSPI SmallCap index at the end of each year for this period 
was gathered from the KRX website (Korea Exchange, 2020). The KOSPI SmallCap In-
dex shows companies that are listed on the KOSPI market, whose market capitalization 
is lower than the top 300 firms.  
 
In total, 460 companies were listed on the KOSPI SmallCap index at the end of 2013. 
However, in order to have balanced panel data, only companies that were continuously 
on the KOSPI SmallCap index during the whole period were included. Only 354 of the 
companies were listed on the KOSPI SmallCap index during the whole sample period. 
This means that companies that were delisted during this period were excluded, which 
can cause survivorship bias, as only the companies that do well enough to be continuously 
listed are included. But as the sample is limited to firms on the KOSPI SmallCap index, 
it means that firms that grew and moved to the KOSPI MidCap index, for instance, were 
also excluded. This can slightly counteract the survivorship bias. Furthermore, in order to 
have comparable data for the firms, only firms that had their financial closing year at the 
end of the year in December were included in the final data sample. Also, as has been 
standard in other studies on the performance of family firms, financial companies were 
excluded from the data sample.  
 
Firms were counted as family firms or non-family firms based on the equity held by fam-
ily members and/or family relationships between the members of the board of directors 
at the end of 2013 and 2017 (so it was assumed that firms do not e.g. change from being 
a family firm to a non-family firm and then back to being a family firm again during the 
sample period). From the sample of firms, five firms changed their ownership structure 
from being a family firm to a non-family firm, and one non-family firm changed to being 
a family firm during the sample period. These firms were removed from the sample, thus 
addressing possible endogeneity concerns for firms that changed ownership structure dur-
ing the sample period. Only firms that were also found in the Orbis database were in-
cluded. Two firms were excluded because they were just ship investment companies (their 
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only business was operating a single ship) which missed basic data, such as sales. In the 
end, the final sample consisted of 307 companies listed on the KOSPI SmallCap index 
for 5 years 
 
The process for determining if a firm is a family-firm or a non-family firm is shown in 
Figure 1. A firm was defined as a family firm if the CEO was also a board member, and/or 
if the family members of the CEO were a part of the board of directors. A firm was also 
determined to be a family firm if the family members owned more than 20% of the equity 
of a firm, or a lone CEO owned more than 20% of the firm’s equity. The firm was also 
determined to be a family firm if the CEO was related to the founder of the firm or the 
previous CEO (the firm was passed on to the next generation). 
 
 
Figure 1. Process for determining ownership of firms. 
  
In order to determine whether a firm is family-owned or not, the firms’ annual reports 
obtained from the Repository of Korea’s Corporate Filings DART (Data Analysis, Re-
trieval and Transfer System), a government agency which offers all info and data submit-
ted to the financial supervisory service, were used (Financial Supervisory Service, 2020). 
From the annual report, the status of shareholders, the status of employees and the com-
position of the board of directors were obtained. In the annual reports’ list of major share-
holders in the firms, the percentage of shares held by the major shareholders and the re-
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lationship between them is stated. For many firms, the type of family relationship is di-
rectly mentioned. It was for example possible to observe in many cases that uncles, sib-
lings and other relatives shared a big portion of the shares in the firm. Then, in many 
cases, the same names as those found on the list of major shareholders were also on the 
list of members of the board of directors, making it easy to determine if the firm is a 
family firm even if the equity held did not exceed 20%. 
 
For some firms, the type of family relationship was not directly stated, it was instead 
mentioned as a “special relationship”. When family members were not listed as major 
shareholders of the firm, I used the Korean search engine NAVER to look up information 
about possible family relationships between the members on the board of directors in 
order to determine if the firm is a family firm. If a family relationship was found, the firm 
was considered as a family firm. The list of major shareholders also mentions if there is 
no relationship between the major shareholders. If the firm was a part of a pyramid own-
ership structure, I searched for the names of the family members’ in the parent firms’ list 
of major shareholders, and if the family members’ were found there, I calculated their 
ultimate ownership in the firm to see if their equity ownership in the firm exceeded 20%, 
and if that was the case, the firm was considered to be family-owned. 
 
The financial data for the sample firms were largely obtained from the Orbis database, 
using the unconsolidated reports of the firms. Market capitalization was obtained from 
the list of KOSPI SmallCap firms found on the KRX website. However, for some com-
panies, the data for some fields were missing in Orbis. These missing data were thus 
handpicked from the unconsolidated financial statements and income statements from the 
annual reports of the companies retrieved from DART. The industry classifications of the 
companies were collected from the KRX website. The Korea Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (KSIC) was used to determine the industry of the companies. 
 
 
5.2 Measures of Firm performance 
 
In total, four different measures of firm performance were used. One, Tobin’s Q, is a 
market measure of firm performance. The three other measures are accounting measures 
of firm performance. They include two different measures for the return on assets (ROA) 





5.2.1 Tobin’s Q 
 
Tobin’s Q was used as a market measure of firm performance, as many previous studies 
have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Andres, 
2008; Martikainen et al., 2009).  
 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market price of a company to the replacement cost of its 
assets and the ratio should ideally, eventually reach 1. This ratio can give views regarding 
the expected future cash flows of the firm. It can be calculated by dividing the market 
value of assets by the estimated replacement cost (Bodie et al., 2014). If Tobin’s Q is high, 
the firms’ commercial value is higher than the cost of replacing the capital. 
 
Tobin’s Q is a measure that looks at the future performance of a firm by comparing the 
value that the market puts on the firm to the book value. It can be used to show the growth 
opportunities of a firm (King & Santor, 2008).  
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated using the following definition (Shin, Park, Cho, & Choi, 2019): 
 






5.2.2 Return on Assets 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) is the most common way to measure firm performance. ROA 
has been used as an accounting measure of firm performance in many previous studies 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Andres, 2008; Martikainen et al., 2009).  
 
The formula for calculating ROA uses EBITDA, EBIT, or net income, the firm’s annual 
earnings as the numerator. EBITDA, EBIT and net income can be found from the income 
statements of firms. Total assets is used as the dominator in this formula. Total assets 
includes firm assets, current assets and fixed assets (Brealey et al., 2011). In contrast to 
Tobin’s Q, ROA looks at the past. ROA is a measure showing the past profitability of a 




In this study, ROA is calculated in two different ways. Total assets is used as the denom-














5.2.3 Return on Equity 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) is also one basic factor showing the firm’s growth rate of earn-
ings. Unlike ROA, ROE does not take into account debt when measuring profitability. 
ROE focuses on the profitability of equity investments (Bodie et al., 2014). ROE is cal-
culated by dividing net income with shareholders’ equity. 
 








This paper focuses on the difference between family-owned firms’ performance and non-
family owned firms’ performance. Firm performances will be measured with Tobin’s Q, 
two types of ROA and ROE. The regression model I use is similar to the one used by 
Anderson & Reeb (2003b).  
 
(5) 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚) + 𝛽2(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) +





The dependent variables are the four measures of firm performance and the independent 
variable is firm ownership (if the firm is a family-owned firm, the value used is 1, other-
wise 0 is used as the dummy variable.)  
 
Industry dummies are created using the KSIC definitions. The year dummies have a value 
of 1 for each year.  
 
Firm age is used as a control variable. The age of a firm is calculated as the natural loga-
rithm of the difference between the observation year and the founding year of the firm. It 
has been suggested that a significant cost can be imposed when a large shareholder insists 
on being involved in the management of a firm, despite no longer being competent for 
the role. This means that the firm age for a family firm could be negatively related to firm 
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b).  
 
The next control variable used is firm size. The firm size is calculated as the natural log-
arithm of the total assets of a firm. Larger and older firms can be more liquid, have im-
proved disclosure, receive more attention from analysts, and be more diversified, which 
decreases the risk of financial distress. But smaller and younger firms can have better 
opportunities for growth (Claessens, Djankov, Joseph, & Larry, 2002). However, the in-
creased diversification of a large firm may also have a negative impact, because it may 
result in increased bureaucratic and agency costs. Similarly, age can also have a negative 
impact. An older firm may be more complex, which can lead to more agency problems 
(Choi et al., 2007). 
 
Another control variable used is leverage. Leverage shows the debt in the capital structure 
of a firm. It can express the riskiness of a firm: the more debt a firm takes on, the riskier 
it is. It is more likely that firms with a high leverage ratio will experience financial distress 
during economically bad times when the positive aspects of leverage decrease at the same 
time as well (Kim & Lee, 2003). Leverage is measured here as the total debt divided by 
total assets as by Andres (2008): 
 





The following control variable used is capital intensity, evaluated by dividing the tangible 









For investors, it could be easier to directly monitor firms that are more reliant on tangible 
assets, and because the firms are easier to monitor, it could lead to better governance. For 
firms with more intangible assets, it is the opposite, as they can be harder to monitor, it 
could lead to weaker governance (Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006). The value-maximizing size 
of a firm tells how large a firm should be in order to be competitive in a certain industry. 
A larger value-maximizing size means that it is more expensive to own a certain fraction 
of the firm and to concentrate the ownership to a few shareholders. So the more capital 
intensive a firm is, the external financing that a firm requires in order to obtain the value-
maximizing size is larger, which in turn dilutes family ownership in the firm. So family 
ownership may be less present in firms with a high capital intensity (Villalonga & Amit, 
2010). The results of Villalonga & Amit (2010) showed this to be true for their sample of 
publicly traded US firms. 
 
The turnover of a firm is also used as a control variable. Turnover is calculated by dividing 
sales by total assets. The ratio of sales to total assets (ATO) can be used as an indicator 
of the efficiency of the firms’ usage of assets (Bodie et al., 2014). This control variable is 
therefore used in this study, as it has been used in previous studies (Abdullah, Shah, Gohar, 
& Iqbal, 2011). 
 





The Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE variables are slightly modified by 1% winsorizing in order 





6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
All of the 307 sample firms are listed according to their industry classification in Table 2. 
The names of the individual companies, their ticker symbols, industry classification and 
ownership type can be viewed in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 2. Companies listed on the KOSPI SmallCap index according to their industry. 
Industry Number of companies Percent 
Chemicals 40 13.03 
Communication 1 0.33 
Construction 16 5.21 
Distribution 24 7.82 
Electrical & Electronic Equipment 24 7.82 
Electricity & Gas 3 0.98 
Fishing 1 0.33 
Food & Beverages 16 5.21 
Iron & Metal Products 27 8.79 
Machinery 24 7.82 
Medical & Precision Machines 2 0.65 
Medical Supplies 13 4.23 
Mining 1 0.33 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 9 2.93 
Other Manufacture 5 1.63 
Paper & Wood 18 5.86 
Services 31 10.1 
Textile & Wearing Apparel 15 4.89 
Transport & Storage 11 3.58 
Transport Equipment 26 8.47 
Total 307 100 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the industry with the largest amount of firms is the Chemicals 
industry with about 13 percent share of the total amount of firms, followed by Services 
and Transport Equipment. The industries Communication, Mining and Fishing only had 




It can be seen that for this sample of firms from the KOSPI SmallCap Index, a large 
number of firms are in industries related to manufacturing, such as Machinery, Iron & 
Metal Products and Electrical & Electronic Equipment. In fact, 219 firms, or slightly over 
70% of the firms belong under the Manufacturing industry supersector of the KSIC. The 
industries that belong to the manufacturing industry supersector can be viewed in Appen-
dix 2. 
 








Chemicals 28 12 70.0% 
Communication 0 1 0.0% 
Construction 6 10 37.5% 
Distribution 12 12 50.0% 
Electrical & Electronic Equipment 14 10 58.3% 
Electricity & Gas 3 0 100.0% 
Fishing 1 0 100.0% 
Food & Beverages 14 2 87.5% 
Iron & Metal Products 20 7 74.1% 
Machinery 17 7 70.8% 
Medical & Precision Machines 1 1 50.0% 
Medical Supplies 5 8 38.5% 
Mining 1 0 100.0% 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 7 2 77.8% 
Other Manufacture 3 2 60.0% 
Paper & Wood 13 5 72.2% 
Services 14 17 45.2% 
Textile & Wearing Apparel 13 2 86.7% 
Transport & Storage 7 4 63.6% 
Transport Equipment 20 6 76.9% 
Total 199 108 64.8% 
 
Table 3 shows in more detail the distribution of family firms and non-family firms per 
industry. For the whole sample, 64.8% of the firms were family firms, which is 199 firms 
out of a total of 307 firms. As some industries have only a few companies, such as Medical 
& Precision and Electricity & Gas, it is hard to tell the actual ratio of family firms to non-




However, some industries with a larger number of firms show a high rate of family firms. 
The industries Chemicals, Food & Beverages, Iron & Metal Products, Machinery, Paper 
& Wood, Textile & Wearing Apparel and Transport Equipment have a larger number of 
firms, and they all have a percentage of family firms above 70%. They fall under the 
manufacturing industry supersector of KSIC. The percentage of family firms for the man-
ufacturing industry sector is 70.78%, which is higher than for the whole sample of firms. 
But family firms are actually a majority in most of the industries, not only those under 
the manufacturing supersector. There are only a few industries that have a ratio lower 
than 50% of family firms to non-family firms: Construction, Medical Supplies and Ser-
vices. 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive summary statistics for all firms. The table shows the mean, 
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum numbers for the dependent variables and 
the control variables. The total number of companies observed is 307, with observations 
for 5 years, thus the total observations per variable are 1535. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics for all companies. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Tobin's Q 307 0.64  0.59  0.07  3.57  
ROA (EBITDA) 307 2.42  6.09  -21.85  17.81  
ROA (Net income) 307 -0.06  9.07  -43.31  16.36  
ROE (Net income) 307 -3.23  27.16  -162.84  37.24  
Total Assets (ln) 307 18.96  0.85  15.78  21.64  
Turnover 307 0.91  0.51  0.01  4.12  
Age (ln) 307 3.50  0.70  0.00  4.79  
Leverage 307 0.43  0.21  0.01  1.13  
Capital Intensity 307 0.31  0.21  0.00  0.96  
 
Total assets are calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets, and the age variable is 
also evaluated with the natural logarithm. The mean value of Tobin’s Q for the whole 
sample is 0.64, which is rather low. The average ROA using EBITDA is positive at 2.42, 
while the mean of ROA using net income is negative, -0.06. The average ROE is -3.23. 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the summary statistics for family-owned firms and non-family 
firms respectively. Family firms have a higher mean value for all of the accounting meas-
ure variables of firm performance. But the market measure of firm performance, Tobin’s 
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Q, is much lower for family firms. Family firms show less variation, as the standard de-
viation of every variable is smaller for family firms than it is for non-family owned firms.  
 
Table 5. Summary statistics for family-owned companies. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Tobin's Q 199 0.54  0.45  0.07  3.57  
ROA (EBITDA) 199 3.27  4.54  -18.81  17.81  
ROA (Net income) 199 1.68  6.12  -43.31  16.36  
ROE (Net income) 199 1.00  19.12  -162.84  37.24  
Total Assets (ln) 199 19.09  0.80  16.79  21.64  
Turnover 199 0.95  0.49  0.01  3.74  
Age (ln) 199 3.62  0.57  0.69  4.62  
Leverage 199 0.43  0.20  0.01  1.09  
Capital Intensity 199 0.32  0.18  0.00  0.95  
 
Table 6. Summary statistics for non-family owned companies. 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Tobin's Q 108 0.83  0.75  0.07  3.57  
ROA (EBITDA) 108 0.85  8.00  -21.85  17.81  
ROA (Net income) 108 -3.26  12.22  -43.31  16.36  
ROE (Net income) 108 -11.04  36.47  -162.84  37.24  
Total Assets 108 18.71  0.90  15.78  20.66  
Turnover 108 0.85  0.55  0.04  4.12  
Age 108 3.27  0.85  0.00  4.79  
Leverage 108 0.42  0.23  0.01  1.13  
Capital Intensity 108 0.30  0.24  0.00  0.96  
 
Table 7 shows the correlation between the dependent variables, independent variables 
and control variables. When it comes to the accounting measures, ROA (EBITDA), ROA 
(Net income) and ROE (Net income), family firms have a strong positive correlation with 
a better firm performance which is in agreement with the hypothesis H1. The correlation 
between the family firm dummy variable and all dependent variables is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. However, family firms have a negative correlation coefficient 
with Tobin’s Q, -0.237. Besides that, the family firm dummy variable has a strong posi-
tive correlation with total assets, turnover ratio and age, also significant at the 1% level 








6.2 Univariate test 
 
 
Table 8 clearly shows the difference between family firms and non-family firms. Except 
for leverage and capital intensity, the result for every variable is statistically significant 
at the 1% level when comparing family firms and non-family firms.  
 
Table 8. Univariate test table, summary statistics for the sample firms. 
Variable Family Firm Non-family firm t-values 
Tobin's Q 0.5395  0.8340  8.2942*** 
ROA (EBITDA) 3.2735  0.8460  -6.5088*** 
ROA (Net income) 1.6750  -3.2640  -8.8117*** 
ROE (Net income) 1.0045  -11.0379  -7.1571*** 
Total Assets (ln) 19.0871  18.7121  -8.1048*** 
Turnover 0.9450  0.8529  -3.2411*** 
Age (ln) 3.6225  3.2735  -8.5189*** 
Leverage 0.4337  0.4224  -0.9614 
Capital Intensity 0.3153  0.2954  -1.669* 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
  
TQ RO A1 RO A2 RO E FF TA TO AGE LEV CapInt
TQ
RO A1 -0.128***
RO A2 -0.144*** 0.746***
RO E -0.054** 0.596*** 0.829***
FF -0.237*** 0.190*** 0.260*** 0.212***
TA -0.561*** 0.203*** 0.241*** 0.145*** 0.210***
TO -0.123*** 0.250*** 0.223*** 0.162*** 0.086*** 0.074***
AGE -0.114*** -0.069*** 0.007 0.025 0.237*** 0.153*** 0
LEV -0.382*** -0.178*** -0.247*** -0.314*** 0.026 0.318*** 0.238*** 0.107***
CapInt -0.229*** 0.103*** 0.046* 0.011 0.046* 0.140*** -0.098*** -0.039 0.139***
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Having obtained the results of the univariate test in Table 8, the values found in Table 5 
and Table 6 can be compared with those from Table 8 in order to observe the differences 
between family-owned firms and non-family owned firms. When it comes to the market 
performance measure, Tobin’s Q, the average is 0.54 for family firms while it is 0.83 for 
non-family firms. The test shows that Tobin’s Q is lower for family firms compared to 
non-family firms. The result is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Another significant result that can be observed from the tables is that the values of the 
accounting measures, both ROA measures (EBITDA and Net Income) and ROE, show 
that family firms have superior performance to non-family firms. ROA using Net Income 
and ROE even have negative average values (-3.26 and -11.04) for non-family firms, 
while family-owned firms have positive values (1.68 and 1). These results support the 
hypothesis H1, that family firms outperform non-family firms. 
 
So the market measure and the accounting measures show opposite results. This result is 
quite similar to the result of King & Santor (2008): family firms from their sample had 
higher ROAs but lower Tobin’s Q compared to other firms. As earlier mentioned, the 
reason proposed for this was that family-owned firms might have higher profitability, but 
that future expectation on cash flows are lower because investors see a threat of expro-
priation by the controlling shareholders. So the same may be true for the sample of family 
firms in this thesis. Family firms have higher profitability as shown by ROE and ROA, 
but investors might fear expropriation and so they do not have higher expectations on 
cash flow for the family firms. An interesting topic for future research could be to divide 
the family firms into those that use dual-class shares, and those with a single-class share, 
to see if the firms using dual-class shares accounted for the negative market performance, 
as in the study by King & Santor (2008).  
 
An alternative explanation for the opposite results for the market measure and the ac-
counting measures could be that the market does not reflect the firm value properly in the 
stock price for firms on the KOSPI SmallCap index, perhaps due to the small size of the 
firms.  
 
Tobin’s Q had a negative relationship with ROE and ROA in the correlation matrix as 
well. The regression result has the same direction of correlation which is negative and 




Family firms are larger than non-family firms, as the values for the natural logarithm of 
total assets is greater for family firms. The turnover ratio of family firms is also greater 
with significance at the 1% level. The leverage for family firms is slightly greater, but it 
is not statistically significant. So unlike the results of several previous studies, family 
firms do not seem to take on less debt than non-family firms. Family firms have greater 
capital intensity at a 10% significance. The result for the linear logarithm of age shows 
that family firms are older than non-family firms, at a 1% significance level. With an 
average age of 42 years, family firms are older than non-family firms, which have an 
average age of 34 years. Clearly, families tend to hold on to their ownership in the firms, 
so endogeneity should not be a concern. 
 
 
6.3 Multivariate test 
 
Table 9 shows the results from Pooled OLS regressions for the four different dependent 
variables, Tobin’s Q, ROA1 (EBITDA), ROA2 (Net income) and ROE. All firm perfor-
mance variables have an exceptionally statistically significant linear relationship with 
family-owned firms at 1%. Age had a strong correlation with Tobin’s Q in the correlation 
matrix table, however, the correlation is lost in regression. More notably, the family firm 
variable had a negative relationship with Tobin’s q. Also, the sample firms of this paper 
had a negative relationship between total assets and Tobin’s Q. Same as in the results of 
the univariate test, Table 9 again strongly shows that family firms perform better than 
non-family firms with accounting measures, while they perform worse according to the 
market measure. 
 
Table 9. Family ownership and firm performance. 
Variable Tobin’s Q ROA1 ROA2 ROE 
Family Firm -0.159*** 1.725*** 3.523*** 8.501***   
Total Assets (ln) -0.311*** 1.839*** 3.298*** 7.389***   
Turnover -0.050** 3.727*** 5.168*** 13.069***   
Age (ln) 0.001 -0.852*** -0.458 0.219 
Leverage -0.586*** -9.994*** -18.357*** -59.177***   
Capital Intensity -0.394*** 4.016*** 3.556*** 8.010***   
Intercept 7.050*** -30.930*** -61.183*** -138.527***   
Adjusted R-square 0.394 0.236 0.294 0.248 




Table 10 is carried out as a Pooled OLS but with controlled year and industry variables.  
The data of this study is composed of panel data. In other words, the data has mixed 
characteristics of cross-sectional data and time-series data as the company’s repeating 
year. In this study, following (Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2010), the t-value is calculated 
using standard error two-way company-year clustering. If we do not use this method, 
there can be a correlation in the cluster. There is a possibility to have a standard error 
lower than it actually should be in the result. 
 
Table 10. Family ownership and firm performance with the year and industry dummy 
variables. 
Variable Tobin’s Q ROA1 ROA2 ROE 
Family Firm -0.114** 1.758*** 3.295*** 8.382***   
Total Assets (ln) -0.291*** 1.889*** 3.244*** 8.014***   
Turnover -0.022 3.816*** 4.800*** 12.730***   
Age (ln) -0.023 -0.649 -0.551 0.218 
Leverage -0.476*** -9.451*** -18.387*** -59.243***   
Capital Intensity -0.413*** 3.843*** 2.453 9.522*     
Intercept 6.525*** -31.708*** -57.486*** -150.272***   
Adjusted R-square 0.48 0.281 0.323 0.259 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
The result of the regression with the year and industry dummies in Table 10 shows the 
difference compared to Table 9, the direction of the relationship is still strongly consistent. 
Family firms tend to have a low Tobin’s Q value compared to non-family owned firms, 
although the result is now significant at the 5% level instead of the 1% level. Accordingly, 
as family firms have higher values for ROA and ROE, it shows that family ownership has 
a positive effect on the accounting measures for firm performance. The results for the 
accounting measures are still significant at the 1% level.  
 
There are some changes in the coefficients with the values being smaller in Table 10 
compared to Table 9. But Table 10 still has a similar result as Table 9, as the direction of 
the relationship is the same, and the majority of variables keep their statistical significance. 
Only a few variables lose their statistical significance. The regression results were 
checked with the sandwich estimator of White (1980) and the clustered sandwich estima-
tor as mentioned by Froot (1989) to check for heteroscedasticity. The check with the es-
timators gave the same results, so any concerns of heteroscedasticity could be dismissed. 
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With the obtained results, the hypothesis H1, that family firms outperform non-family 
firms, is accepted. The null hypothesis that the ownership of a firm does not have a sig-






7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to find out if family ownership affects firms’ performance 
for companies that are listed during 2013–2017 on the KOSPI SmallCap index on the 
Korea Exchange. The ownership structure of firms can affect the management or behavior 
of firms in various ways, and this in turn would have an effect on the performance of 
firms. This topic has been examined in a vast number of studies in the field and some 
interesting results have been shown. 
 
Korea has become well known as a country that has special ownership structures and its 
own culture also has special characteristics for the family itself. It was thought that stud-
ying Korean small-cap firms would make for an interesting research topic which would 
add some new value, as there have already been many studies on the large chaebol firms 
that are characteristic of Korea. 
 
It was found out that that family ownership clearly had an impact on the sample of listed 
Korean companies and the effect was positive for accounting measures of firm perfor-
mance. This thesis used Pooled OLS regression to find out the association between firm 
performance and family ownership of firms. Firm performance was measured with To-
bin’s Q, two measures of ROA (EBITDA and Net Income) and ROE, and family owner-
ship was used as the dummy variable, telling whether the firm is family-owned or not. A 
firm was decided to be a family-owned firm in three ways: if the CEO is also a board 
member or if family members of the CEO are also members on the board of directors, or 
if the family or lone CEO owns more than 20% equity of firm, or if the CEO is a family 
member of the firm founder or the previous CEO.  
 
The regression results of this paper show that the family firms of the sample have a ten-
dency of being larger, having larger values for total assets. Family firms also had larger 
turnover ratios. On average, also leverage and capital intensity are higher for family-
owned firms than for non-family owned firms. With the fact that the average age of family 
firms is longer than the average age of non-family owned firms, it shows that families 
tend to maintain their firms for a long time and they do not release their hold of the firm, 
which removed the worries of endogeneity.  
 
Most importantly, this paper could show a clear result for accounting measures of perfor-
mance that family firms outperform non-family firms. It proves that family ownership 
has an effect on firm performance and that the effect is positive, as it was shown that the 
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results were statistically significant at the 1% level. For the market measure, however, 
family firms performed worse than non-family firms, and the results were significant at 
the 5% level. Regardless, the hypothesis H1, that family firms outperform non-family 
firms, was accepted. 
 
For possible further research, it would be great if family ownership could be sorted into 
different categories instead of only using a dummy variable which states whether the firm 
is a family firm or not. For instance, taking into account different rates of equity owner-
ship by the family, while only measuring equity ownership and no other types of owner-
ship (family members on the board of directors or next-generation CEO). This could add 
value. Alternatively, one could also distinguish between the type of CEO (lone CEO or 
CEO with family members), or if the firm is held by a large number of family members 
who each hold a small fraction of the firm’s equity, but it adds up to a large sum. Also, 
family firms could be divided into those which have dual-class shares, and those which 
have single-class shares, to see if the negative market performance of family firms is 
caused by the use of dual-class shares. One could also conduct the same research for firms 
on the KOSPI MidCap index and compare the results with these results for firms on the 
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DONGWHA PHARM CO.,LTD. 000020 Medical Supplies no 
KR MOTORS CO.,LTD. 000040 Transport Equipment yes 
SUNGCHANG ENTERPRISE HOLD-
INGS LIMITED 
000180 Services yes 
DAYOU PLUS CO.,LTD. 000300 Transport Equipment no 
DAEDONG INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 000490 Machinery yes 
GAON CABLE CO.,LTD. 000500 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
SAMIL PHARM. CO.,LTD. 000520 Medical Supplies yes 
CHUNIL EXPRESS CO.,LTD. 000650 Transport & Storage Yes 
HWACHEON MACHINE TOOL 
CO.,LTD. 
000850 Machinery yes 
BOHAE BREWERY CO.,LTD. 000890 Food & Beverages yes 
UNION CORPORATION 000910 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 
CHONBANG CO.,LTD. 000950 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
PAPER COREA INC. 001020 Paper & Wood no 
TAIHAN TEXTILE CO.,LTD. 001070 Textile & Wearing Apparel Yes 
KUKBO CO.,LTD. 001140 Transport & Storage no 
KUMHO ELECTRIC INC. 001210 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
NAMKWANG ENGINEERING & 
CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. 
001260 Construction no 
PAIKKWANG INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 001340 Chemicals yes 
SAMSUNG PHARMACEUTICAL 
CO.,LTD. 
001360 Medical Supplies no 
SG CHOONGBANG CO.,LTD. 001380 Transport Equipment no 
KG CHEMICAL CORPORATION 001390 Chemicals yes 
TAEWON MULSAN CO.,LTD. 001420 Transport Equipment yes 
BYC CO.,LTD. 001460 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
DI DONGIL CORPORATION 001530 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
CHOBI CO.,LTD. 001550 Chemicals yes 
CHEIL GRINDING WHEEL IND. 
CO.,LTD. 
001560 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 
KUMYANG CO.,LTD. 001570 Chemicals yes 
KBI DONGKOOK IND. CO., LTD. 001620 Transport Equipment yes 
SHINHWA SILUP CO.,LTD. 001770 Iron & Metal Products yes 
TS CORPORATION 001790 Food & Beverages yes 
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SAMWHA CAPACITOR CO.,LTD. 001820 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
SAMHO INTERNATIONAL CO.,LTD 001880 Construction NO 
NAMYEUNG VIVIEN CORPORATION 002070 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
KYUNGNONG CORP. 002100 Chemicals yes 
KOREA INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 002140 Food & Beverages Yes 
DOHWA ENGINEERING CO.,LTD. 002150 Services yes 
SAMYANG TONGSANG CO.,LTD. 002170 Other Manufacture yes 
KOREA EXPORT PACKAGING IND. 
CO.,LTD. 
002200 Paper & Wood yes 
DONG SUNG PHARM. CO.,LTD 002210 Medical Supplies yes 
HANIL IRON & STEEL CO.,LTD. 002220 Iron & Metal Products yes 
ALVOGEN KOREA CO LTD 002250 Medical Supplies no 
HANKUK PAPER MFG. CO.,LTD. 002300 Paper & Wood yes 
ASIA PAPER MFG. CO.,LTD. 002310 Paper & Wood yes 
SH ENERGY CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 002360 Chemicals no 
BUMYANG CONSTRUCTION 
CO.,LTD. 
002410 Construction no 
THE CENTURY CO.,LTD. 002420 Services yes 
HWASUNG INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD 002460 Construction yes 
CHOHEUNG CORPORATION 002600 Food & Beverages yes 
SHINIL ELECTRONICS CO.,LTD. 002700 Distribution yes 
TCC STEEL CORP. 002710 Iron & Metal Products yes 
KUKJE PHARMA  CO.,LTD. 002720 Medical Supplies yes 
BOLAK CO.,LTD. 002760 Chemicals yes 
SUNCHANG CORPORATION 002820 Paper & Wood yes 
MIWON COMMERCIAL CO.,LTD. 002840 Chemicals yes 
SHINPOONG PAPER MFG. CO.,LTD. 002870 Paper & Wood Yes 
DAYOU AUTOMOTIVE SEAT-TECH-
NOLOGY CO.,LTD 
002880 Transport Equipment yes 
TONGYANG MOOLSAN CO.,LTD. 002900 Machinery yes 
YOOSUNG ENTERPRISE CO.,LTD. 002920 Transport Equipment yes 
HAEIN CORPORATION 003010 Distribution yes 
APROGEN PHARMACEUTI-
CALS,INC. 
003060 Medical Supplies no 
SUNGBO CHEMICALS CO.,LTD. 003080 Chemicals yes 
HEUNG-A SHIPPING CO.,LTD. 003280 Transport & Storage no 
HANKOOK COSMETICS MANUFAC-
TURING CO.,LTD. 
003350 Chemicals Yes 
IHQ,INC. 003560 Services no 
NEXT SCIENCE CO.,LTD. 003580 Mining yes 
MICHANG OIL IND. CO.,LTD. 003650 Chemicals yes 
HANSUNG ENTERPRISE CO.,LTD. 003680 Food & Beverages yes 
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SAMYOUNG CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 003720 Chemicals Yes 
CHIN YANG INDUSTRY CO.,LTD. 003780 Chemicals yes 
DAEHAN SYNTHETIC FIBER 
CO.,LTD. 
003830 Chemicals no 
SAJO DAERIM CORP. 003960 Food & Beverages yes 
SG CORPORATION 004060 Distribution no 
SHINHUNG CO.,LTD. 004080 Distribution Yes 
KOREA PETROLEUM IND. CO.,LTD. 004090 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 
TAEYANG METAL IND. CO.,LTD. 004100 Transport Equipment yes 
DONGBANG TRANSPORT LOGIS-
TICS CO.,LTD. 
004140 Transport & Storage yes 
KOREA DEVELOPMENT CORPORA-
TION 
004200 Construction no 
NPC CO.,LTD. 004250 Chemicals yes 
NAMSUNG CORPORATION 004270 Distribution Yes 
SAMICK THK CO.,LTD 004380 Machinery yes 
SEOUL FOOD INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 004410 Food & Beverages Yes 
SAMHWA CROWN & CLOSURE 
CO.,LTD. 
004450 Machinery Yes 
KLEAN NARA CO.,LTD. 004540 Paper & Wood yes 
HYUNDAI BNG STEEL CO.,LTD. 004560 Iron & Metal Products yes 
WOORIDUL PHARMACEUTICAL 
LIMITED 
004720 Medical Supplies no 
SUNNY ELECTRONICS CORP. 004770 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
DUKSUNG CO.,LTD. 004830 Chemicals yes 
T WAY HOLDINGS INCORPORA-
TION. 
004870 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
DONGIL INDUSTRIES CO.,LTD. 004890 Iron & Metal Products yes 
CHOKWANG PAINT LIMITED 004910 Chemicals yes 
CITECH CO.,LTD. 004920 Other Manufacture no 
HANSHIN ENGINEERING & CON-
STRUCTION CO.,LTD. 
004960 Construction yes 
SUNGSHIN CEMENT CO.,LTD. 004980 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 
HUSTEEL CO.,LTD. 005010 Iron & Metal Products yes 
PUSAN CAST IRON CO.,LTD. 005030 Transport Equipment no 
COSMO ADVANCED MATERIALS & 
TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD 
005070 Chemicals NO 
HANCHANG CORPORATION 005110 Distribution no 
DONGSUNG CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 005190 Chemicals no 
KUKDONG CORPORATION 005320 Distribution yes 
MONAMI CO.,LTD. 005360 Distribution Yes 
COSMO CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 005420 Chemicals NO 
KOREA AIRPORT SERVICE CO.,LTD. 005430 Transport & Storage no 






Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
No 
PHARMICELL CO.,LTD. 005690 Medical Supplies no 
DAELIM B & CO CO.,LTD. 005750 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 
WONLIM CORPORATION 005820 Textile & Wearing Apparel Yes 
HUNEED TECHNOLOGIES CO.,LTD. 005870 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
DONGBU CORPORATION 005960 Construction yes 
SUNGJEE CONSTRUCTION CO LTD 005980 Construction no 
OYANG CORPORATION 006090 Food & Beverages yes 
SAM-A ALUMINIUM CO.,LTD. 006110 Iron & Metal Products no 
DAEWON CABLE CO.,LTD. 006340 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
Yes 
INSCOBEE, INC. 006490 Communication no 
DAELIM TRADING CO.,LTD. 006570 Machinery no 
SAMSUNG CLIMATE CONTROL 
CO.,LTD. 
006660 Transport Equipment yes 
TAEKYUNG CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 006890 Chemicals no 
WOOSUNG FEED CO.,LTD. 006980 Food & Beverages yes 
ILSHIN STONE CO.,LTD. 007110 Distribution no 
MIRAE ING CO.,LTD. 007120 Services no 
KOREA STEEL SHARPES CO.,LTD. 007280 Iron & Metal Products no 
APROGEN KIC CO.,LTD. 007460 Machinery Yes 
DONGBANG AGRO CORPORATION 007590 Chemicals yes 
SEONDO ELECTRIC CO.,LTD. 007610 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
POLUS BIO PHARM  CO.,LTD. 007630 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
F&F CO.,LTD. 007700 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
PAN PACIFIC CO.,LTD. 007980 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
SAJODONGAONE CO.,LTD. 008040 Food & Beverages yes 
EAGON INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD 008250 Paper & Wood yes 
NI STEEL CO.,LTD. 008260 Iron & Metal Products yes 
NAMSUN ALUMINIUM CO.,LTD. 008350 Iron & Metal Products no 
MOONBAE STEEL CO.,LTD. 008420 Iron & Metal Products yes 
ILJEONG INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 008500 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
THE WILLBES & CO.,LTD. 008600 Distribution no 
ANAM ELECTRONICS CO.,LTD. 008700 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
DONGYANG STEEL PIPE CO.,LTD. 008970 Iron & Metal Products no 
KCTC CO.,LTD. 009070 Transport & Storage yes 
KYUNG IN ELECTRONICS CO.,LTD. 009140 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
SIMPAC CO.,LTD. 009160 Machinery yes 
HANSOL LOGISTICS CO., LTD. 009180 Transport & Storage no 
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DAIYANG METAL CO.,LTD. 009190 Iron & Metal Products yes 
MOORIM PAPER CO.,LTD. 009200 Paper & Wood yes 
SHINWON CORPORATION 009270 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
CHARM ENGINEERING CO.,LTD. 009310 Machinery Yes 
DAEWOO ELECTRONIC COMPO-
NENTS CO.,LTD 
009320 Transport Equipment yes 
HANCHANG PAPER CO.,LTD. 009460 Paper & Wood yes 
SAMWHA ELECTRIC CO.,LTD. 009470 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
SAMJUNG PULP CO.,LTD. 009770 Paper & Wood Yes 
NK MULSAN CO.,LTD. 009810 Distribution no 
KOREA REFRACTORIES CO.,LTD. 010040 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 
KOREA FLANGE CO.,LTD. 010100 Transport Equipment yes 
HANSOL PNS CO.,LTD. 010420 Distribution no 
JICO CO.,LTD. 010580 Transport Equipment Yes 
WELLBIOTEC CO.,LTD. 010600 Distribution no 
CHINYANG POLYURETHANE 
CO.,LTD. 
010640 Chemicals yes 
HWACHEON MACHINERY CO.,LTD. 010660 Machinery yes 
FIRSTEC CO.,LTD. 010820 Machinery Yes 
SAMHO DEVELOPMENT CO.,LTD. 010960 Construction yes 
GENEONE LIFE SCIENCE INC. 011000 Medical Supplies no 
ENEX CO.,LTD. 011090 Other Manufacture yes 
CJ SEAFOOD CORPORATION 011150 Food & Beverages no 
SAMWHA ELECTRONICS CO.,LTD. 011230 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
TAILIM PKG CO.,LTD. 011280 Paper & Wood yes 
SEONG AN CO.,LTD. 011300 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
BUSAN INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 011390 Non-metallic Mineral Products no 
GALAXIA SM INC. 011420 Services no 
HAN-NONG CHEMICALS INC. 011500 Chemicals yes 
DB INC. 012030 Services yes 
YOUNGWIRE CO.,LTD. 012160 Iron & Metal Products no 
KIWI MEDIA GROUP CO.,LTD. 012170 Distribution no 
KEYANG ELECTRIC MACHINERY 
CO.,LTD. 
012200 Machinery yes 
YEONGHWA METAL CO.,LTD. 012280 Transport Equipment yes 
CHUNGHO COMNET CO.,LTD. 012600 Machinery no 
KYUNG-IN SYNTHETIC CORPORA-
TION 
012610 Chemicals yes 
MONALISA CO.,LTD. 012690 Paper & Wood no 
DAECHANG CO.,LTD. 012800 Iron & Metal Products yes 
SEWOO GLOBAL CO.,LTD. 013000 Distribution yes 
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ILSUNG CONSTRUCTION CO.,LTD. 013360 Construction no 
HWASEUNG R & A CO.,LTD. 013520 Transport Equipment yes 
KYE-RYONG CONSTRUCTION IN-
DUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 
013580 Construction yes 
CAMUS ENGINEERING & CON-
STRUCTION INC. 
013700 Construction no 
GMB KOREA CORP. 013870 Transport Equipment No 
HAN EXPRESS CO.,LTD. 014130 Transport & Storage yes 
DAEYOUNG PACKAGING CO.,LTD. 014160 Paper & Wood yes 
YOUNGBO CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 014440 Chemicals no 
KEUKDONG OIL & CHEMICALS 
CO.,LTD. 
014530 Chemicals yes 
TAEKYUNG BK CO.,LTD. 014580 Non-metallic Mineral Products yes 




Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
IN THE F CO.,LTD. 014990 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
E-STARCO CO.,LTD. 015020 Services yes 
DAECHANG FORGING CO.,LTD. 015230 Transport Equipment yes 
AUTOMOBILE & PCB INC. 015260 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
YESCO HOLDINGS CO.,LTD. 015360 Electricity & Gas yes 
THELMA THERAPEUTICS 015540 Services no 
CURO CO,.LTD. 015590 Machinery no 
TAEKYUNG INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 015890 Chemicals yes 
DAEHYUN CO.,LTD. 016090 Textile & Wearing Apparel yes 
SHINDAEYANG PAPER CO.,LTD. 016590 Paper & Wood yes 
DAESUNG HOLDINGS CO.,LTD. 016710 Services yes 
KWANG MYUNG ELECTRIC 
CO.,LTD. 
017040 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
MYUNGMOON PHARM. CO.,LTD. 017180 Medical Supplies yes 
WOOSHIN SYS. CO.,LTD. 017370 Machinery yes 
SOOSAN HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
CO.,LTD. 
017550 Machinery yes 
AUK CO.,LTD. 017900 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
CHOIL ALUMINIUM CO.,LTD. 018470 Iron & Metal Products yes 
THN CORPORATION 019180 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
YES 
SEAH SPECIAL STEEL CO.,LTD. 019440 Iron & Metal Products yes 
HITRON SYSTEMS INC. 019490 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
KIDARISTUDIO INC. 020120 Services no 
SEOWON CO.,LTD. 021050 Iron & Metal Products yes 
SAMWON STEEL CO.,LTD. 023000 Transport Equipment yes 





023350 Services no 
DONGNAM CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 023450 Chemicals no 
INZI CONTROLS CO.,LTD. 023800 Transport Equipment yes 
INFAC CORPORATION 023810 Transport Equipment yes 
SC ENGINEERING CO.,LTD. 023960 Construction no 
WISCOM CO.,LTD. 024070 Chemicals yes 
DCM CORP. 024090 Iron & Metal Products yes 
DAEWON CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 024890 Chemicals Yes 
DUCK YANG INDUSTRY CO.,LTD. 024900 Transport Equipment yes 
MIRAE CORPORATION 025560 Medical & Precision Machines no 
HANSOL HOME DECO CO.,LTD. 025750 Paper & Wood no 
LEEKU INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 025820 Iron & Metal Products yes 




Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
BOOKOOK STEEL CO.,LTD. 026940 Iron & Metal Products yes 
MANIKER CO.,LTD. 027740 Food & Beverages YES 
SEHA CORP 027970 Paper & Wood no 
DONGA GEOLOGICAL ENGINEER-
ING COMPANY LTD. 
028100 Construction yes 
DONGWON FISHERIES CO.,LTD. 030720 Fishing yes 
COMTEC SYSTEMS CO.,LTD. 031820 Services yes 
HWANGKUM STEEL & TECHNOL-
OGY CO.,LTD. 
032560 Iron & Metal Products yes 
FEELUX CO.,LTD. 033180 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
KOREA UNITED PHARM INC. 033270 Medical Supplies yes 
SHINSEGAE ENGINEERING & CON-
STRUCTION INC. 
034300 Construction No 
INCHON CITY GAS CORPORATION 034590 Electricity & Gas yes 
GIIR INC. 035000 Services no 
BAIKSAN CO., LTD. 035150 Chemicals yes 
SHINSEGEA I & C CO.,LTD. 035510 Services no 
YG PLUS INC. 037270 Services yes 
SANGSIN BRAKE CO.,LTD 041650 Transport Equipment yes 
JOOYON TECH CO.,LTD. 044380 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
yes 
KSS LINE LTD. 044450 Transport & Storage yes 
UNION MATERIALS CORP. 047400 Non-metallic Mineral Products no 
WOOJIN PLAIMM CO.,LTD. 049800 Machinery YES 
CHIN YANG CHEMICAL CORP. 051630 Chemicals yes 
HANMI GLOBAL CO., LTD. 053690 Services no 
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POSCO COATED & COLOR STEEL 
CO LTD 
058430 Iron & Metal Products no 
DEVELOPMENT  ADVANCE SOLU-
TION CO., LTD. 
058730 Machinery yes 
KTCS CORPORATION 058850 Services NO 
KTIS CORPORATION 058860 Services no 
CKD BIO CORP. 063160 Medical Supplies no 
SAVEZONE I&C CORP. 067830 Distribution no 
SAMSUNG PUBLISHING CO.,LTD. 068290 Services yes 
DAEHO AL CO.,LTD. 069460 Iron & Metal Products no 
HANSAEMK CO.,LTD. 069640 Distribution yes 
DSR WIRE CORP. 069730 Iron & Metal Products yes 
HI STEEL CO.,LTD. 071090 Iron & Metal Products yes 
KOAS CO.,LTD. 071950 Other Manufacture yes 
ENPLUS CO.,LTD. 074610 Machinery no 
SAERON AUTOMOTIVE CORP. 075180 Transport Equipment no 
UNIQUEST CORPORATION 077500 Distribution yes 
TELCOWARE CO.,LTD. 078000 Services yes 
SAJOHAEPYO CORPORATION 079660 Food & Beverages yes 
ILJIN DIAMOND CO.,LTD. 081000 Chemicals no 
GREEN CHEMICAL CO.,LTD. 083420 Chemicals yes 
DAEHAN STEEL CO.,LTD. 084010 Iron & Metal Products yes 
DONGYANG EXPRESS CORP. 084670 Transport & Storage yes 
E-WORLD CO.,LTD. 084680 Services no 
JINDO CO.,LTD. 088790 Distribution yes 
PYUNGHWA INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 090080 Transport Equipment yes 
NOROO PAINT & COATINGS 
CO.,LTD. 
090350 Chemicals yes 
METALABS INC. 090370 Textile & Wearing Apparel no 
SEWON CELLONTECH CO.,LTD. 091090 Machinery no 
DAE-IL CORPORATION 092200 Transport Equipment yes 
E INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT 
CO.,LTD. 
093230 Distribution no 
HYOUSUNG ITX CO.,LTD. 094280 Services yes 
VISANG EDUCATION INC. 100220 Services yes 
S&T CORPORATION 100840 Machinery no 
BTONE CO., LTD. 101140 Distribution no 
DONGSUNG CORPORATION 
CO,.LTD. 
102260 Services Yes 
SBW INC. 102280 Textile & Wearing Apparel no 
WOONGJIN ENERGY CO LTD 103130 
Electrical & Electronic Equip-
ment 
no 
WOOJIN INC. 105840 Medical & Precision Machines Yes 
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CONBUZZ CO.,LTD. 109070 Paper & Wood no 
DAESUNG ENERGY CO.,LTD. 117580 Electricity & Gas yes 
WOORIDUL HUEBRAIN LIMITED 118000 Distribution no 
KC COTTRELL CO.,LTD. 119650 Machinery no 
CHOSUN WELDING POHANG 
CO.,LTD. 
120030 Machinery yes 
HANKOOK COSMETICS CO.,LTD. 123690 Distribution yes 
SJM CO.,LTD. 123700 Transport Equipment no 
DAESUNG INDUSTRIAL CO.,LTD. 128820 Distribution YES 
INTERGIS CO.,LTD. 129260 Transport & Storage yes 
KOREA ELECTRIC POWER INDUS-
TRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO.,LTD. 
130660 Services no 
MIWON CHEMICALS CO.,LTD. 134380 Chemicals Yes 
SIDIZ, INC. 134790 Other Manufacture no 
SUNJIN CO.,LTD. 136490 Food & Beverages no 
KOLON PLASTICS INC. 138490 Chemicals no 
A SELF-ADMINISTERED REAL ES-
TATE INVESTMENT TRUST INC. 
140910 Services Yes 
KOLON MATERIALS INC. 144620 Chemicals no 
K-TOP REITS CO.,LTD. 145270 Services no 
HI GOLD OCEAN NO.3 SHIP IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY 
153360 Services no 
BADARO NO.19 SHIP INVESTMENT 
COMPANY 
155900 Services no 
HI GOLD OCEAN KMARIN NO.8 
SHIP INVESTMENT COMPANY 
159650 Services no 















Appendix 2: Sample companies by sector including the manufacturing supersector. 
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